Enmity towards Germany had existed ever since the birth of the Czechoslovak state. The Czechs had dug the grave of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, for which neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians owed them any gratitude. When the Poles were fighting for their very existence against Russia, the Czechs robbed them of the valuable Olsa region, including Teschen. The Czech's only friendly neighbor was Romania. They had, however, two powerful allies, France and Russia; not their neighbors, it is true. Paris and Moscow are far distant from Prague. Since 1924 there had been a military alliance with the French, who were to force a decision against Germany on the west. Any weakening of the German Army on that front meant a preponderance for the French. The Czechs were to draw strong German forces on themselves and hold them until a decision had been affected in other theaters of war. They were to fight to gain time, and land fortification helped them attain their object. They had no need for a field army; that would be supplied by the French. All they required was an army that would hold the fortifications to the last ditch. The events that occurred in the autumn of 1938 proved that the overthrow of the huge Bohemian-Moravian fortress would have entailed the employment of several German armies, and this would have greatly reduced the numbers of Germans available for a decision on other fronts.
The other ally, Russia, with whom a pact had existed since 1935, had pledged herself to come, first of all, to the help of the Czechs by air. The "aircraft mother-ship" for the thousands of promised Russian aeroplanes required an extensive and safe space. Owing to the narrowness of the Czechoslovak State, the best solution to the problem would have been the conversion of a large area into landing grounds and its protection by fortifications. The central fortress mentioned had insufficient space for landing grounds.
It must be admitted that the Czechoslovak land fortification could have fulfilled the two requirements. The doubtful point was that the solution was based on the policy of alliances. It stood and fell on this policy. The area of the State, as it existed from 1918 to the autumn of 1938, is of an unsuitable shape for defense and fortification. In a speech delivered in September 1938, Signor Mussolini likened it to a crocodile. The longer axis, from west to east, measures 600 miles (370 km), the cross axis, in the middle, 100 miles (62 km), i.e. only about one-sixth of the length. The length of the boundary is about 2500 miles (4114 km); about one half facing Germany, one quarter facing Poland, one fifth facing Hungary and only one-twentieth facing Romania. In other words, nineteenth-twentieths faces potentially unfriendly neighbors.
It paid the Czechs best to turn the attack of their strongest neighbor, Germany, along the line of the longer axis of the country. A successful attack along the shorter axis, especially if made from both sides, would have split the whole country in two. By far the most exposed portion was the district of Moravia, especially since Austria had become part of the Reich. It was on this basis that the Czechoslovak fortifications were carried out and their completion planned.
The northern and southern boundaries of Moravia were to be so strongly fortified that the Germans would think twice of running up against them. On the other hand, the Bohemian defenses were to be so organized as to invite the Germans to break in at that point. The enemy would then be advancing along the longer axis, a favorable position for the Czechs, that would give them the desired breathing space. One position behind the other was thrown up throughout the wide area of Bohemia. Sectors strong by nature, in particular the lines of the Elbe and the Moldau, with the fortified area of Prague. offered good rear-guard positions and were heavily strengthened. In this way, the Czechs, fighting a series of rear-guard actions could fall back upon on the Bohemian-Moravian plateau. Years ago newspaper accounts reported that the Czechs were developing the western slopes of the plateau for agricultural purposes. Doubts were cast upon their accuracy. it may be assumed today that it was the intent to convert the Bohemian-Moravian plateau into an enormous redoubt, whose two flanks were the fortified boundaries of Moravia. The redoubt was open to the east, the obvious line of retreat.
If the inroad into the "Moravian redoubt" proved successful, a series of river lines, notably that of the March (Morava), would have held up an advancing enemy. A further position to meet the attack extended along the White and Lesser Carpathians. Many notices had been published about the peaceful development of these regions. The position rested on the Beskids to the north, and on the Danube to the south, where the flank was protected by the bridge-head at Pressburg (Bratislava). A further attack would have led into the difficult country south of the Carpathians, the former Upper Hungary. In this way the Czechs would have kept the attacker advancing along the longer axis, while their own retreat was open towards the east, i.e. Soviet Russia.
After this preliminary introduction, a description will be given of Czech fortifications, as they fell into the hands of German troops in October, 1938: first, the weaker ones, then the stronger, and finally, the largest works that were met with.
At the boundary crossings German troops came upon barricades of roads and paths. These barricades consisted of lengths of walling extending half-way across the road, alternately on the right and on the left, and loopholed for rifle fire. These walls slowed down oncoming traffic, and a barrier right across finally stopped it altogether.
For permanently closing an approach road to a farm, a double row of lengths of steel rails were embedded vertically in concrete.
Barriers erected in peace-time were supplemented during the crisis by extemporized arrangements. Many bridges were demolished.
Blockhouses, or similar erections from which fire could be brought to
bear on the barricades, were only to be found here and there. Such flanking arrangements had doubtless been planned from French or Belgian models, but there had not been time to carry them out. Note the three loopholes under the verandah in the picture on the right.
The barricades were not manned, as the garrisons were retiring according to plan; so the German advance was not held up.
It is stated that strong blocking defenses were erected in the Carpathian passes against Poland, but no details are available of their location or form of construction. It may be assumed that they were built, since the Czechs know military history far too well not to realize what an important part these passes have played from time immemorial up to the present day.
Light fortifications extend from the Riesen Gebirge all round the Bohemian basin. This light line of posts formed the first line for holding up an attacker on the frontier, and was the first that the Czechs threw up in their haste. An attacker can render these posts ineffective by direct frontal fire (infantry or artillery) on the loopholes. The walls and roof shelter the inmates from shell splinters and rifle fire. It is estimated that 2,000 such posts were built.
Stronger defenses were, as a rule, erected later, by the construction, in front of the light fortifications, of medium works, known as "ear posts." These reinforcements were to be found, especially west of Troppau as far as the eastern slopes of the Altvater Gebirge, also in the Reichenberg basin, in the Bida sector, for the protection of the valuable brown coal district; around Pilsen, to secure the pit-coal basin and the Skoda works; in southern Bohemia and southern Moravia; along the Slovak-Hungarian boundary; and, finally, in the Olsa sector of the Polish border.
An incomplete small loopholed work. The enemy side is on the right. A machinge-gun loophole is visible, protected by a projecting "ear". The layer of protective stone is in the course of construction. This so-called "detonating layer" is designed to catch dropping shells, which it deflects and causes to explode prematurely before they reach the reinforced concrete wall.
Completed medium loopholed post, not yet camouflaged. The enemy side is on the left; the rear, with entrance, on the right. A view is obtained of a M.G. loophole, protected from the front by a projecting buttress. The protective stone layer has been completed complete with an earthen ramp. There are hooks on the edge of the roof to which the camouflage net is attached. To the right, and a little above the loophole, on the rear wall, is a ventilation hole. To the left of the door is a tube (indicated by an arrow) for pushing out hand grenades.
Completed and camouflaged small post. The enemy side is on the right. The upper portion of the protecting "ear" buttress is visible, also the M.G. loophole is discernable as the dark area to the left of the ear.
The posts fire almost only to the flanks. Very few have a loophole for frontal fire. Where this is the case, they are situated on a reverse slope, so that the loophole is not exposed to long-range direct observed fire. Most of these "ear posts" are incapable of defending themselves from the front, but depend upon outside help, e.g. neighboring posts, or posts in rear, or by fire or counter-attacks from open positions. Even the larger Czech works show that the highest value is set on flanking fire, following the French model. Apparently the Czechs go still father than the French with this principle, and abandon frontal fire altogether. These "ear posts " secure protection against medium caliber fire. Their main safeguard depends upon their smallness, their large number, and the difficulty of hitting them. Often three or more lines of such posts lie one behind the other, as the sketch below shows. The distance between the lines varies according to the nature of the country, from 160 to 270 yards (150 to 245 m), the interval between posts from 160 to 440 yards (150 to 400 m). The rearward posts cover the gaps between the forward ones.
In specially important positions this medium type of construction is stiffened by heavy works sited among the posts as shown above. In wooded areas, posts and fire clearances (combined with lines of obstacles) are arranged as shown in the sketch below. 
The fire clearances and infantry obstacles are planned on the principle of a "lazy tongs", in such a way as to compel the attacker to cross two obstacles and two lines of fire.
The heavy form of construction carried out in the Moravian depression, around the Glatz basin, and in the Landeshut depression, and pushed on in southern Moravia at high pressure since the spring of 1938, consisted of a single line of large works. These had, as a rule, two flanking blocks with twin machine-guns and anti-tank guns, also one to five armored turrets. As in the case of the "ear posts," the main fire effect was produced by flanking and cross fire. Frontal fire was not strongly developed, so that the redoubt depended upon support from neighboring works. In this case, too there were several standard designs that could be adapted to the site with slight modifications.
A back view of the work (from the gorge). The front is a line connecting the two armored turrets. They have several loopholes to bring fire to bear to the front, flank and gorge. Under the two turrets are buttresses to protect the two flanking blocks. The photo gives a view of the right flanking block: in front, on the right of the picture, 1 anti-tank gun loophole, in the rear, on the left side of the picture is 1 M.G. loophole. The entrance, with loopholed protection, lies in the middle of the gorge.
These works are proof against fire of guns up to a caliber of about 12 inches (300 mm). Roofs and walls are of reinforced concrete up to 8 feet (2.2 m) thick, armored turrets are 8 inches (200 mm) thick. The works have, as a rule, an upper and a lower story.
This three-turreted work is seen from the enemy side. It is not yet camouflaged and the masses of concrete show up clearly against the ground. The turrets are so deeply embedded in the concrete that it is only just possible to fire out of the loopholes.
On the strongly fortified fronts these redoubts are spaced at intervals averaging 550 yards (450 m), varying according to their tactical importance and the nature of the country. They usually form the front line of resistance. Behind them comes a second line of machine-gun posts. Apart from a few exceptional cases, the Czechs made a point of purposely placing the strongest works in front and weaker one in rear. The attacker is made to meet the stiffest resistance from the very start. If he should succeed, with heavy losses, in breaking this resistance, he will, while badly shaken, hit upon the weaker defenses, which will be strong enough to hold him up in his weakened condition. The usual principle adopted by the French is to meet the attacker in the out-field with weaker defenses, so as to loosen his formations and break up the attack. The attacker will then reach the main line of resistance greatly weakened, and will finally break up there.
At key points in the position several works were combined to form a group of works. The construction of these was of the strongest, and proof against the heaviest calibers. Roofs and walls were 11 feet (3.3 m) thick, and outside the walls was a layer of stone to detonate shells. The turret armor was 12 inches (300 mm) thick.
Such groups of works were to be found (see map, which is not yet ready for viewing) on the Hrabin mountain (east of Troppau) to stiffen the defenses in the Moravian depression, also round the Glatz basin, i.e., Bergholle, Baudenkoppe, Adamsberg. These three groups covered the lines of invasion from the southern part of the
Glatz basin towards Moravia in the March valley, and towards Bohemia in the upper Elbe valley, the Panske Pole supported the position in the Adlergebirge. The exit from the Glatz county towards Nachod was closed by the Skutinaberg and the Nachod groups. The latter was still in Czech hands when the article was written. The Landeshut depression was closed by the Trautenau
group. If they had been allowed time, the Czechs would doubtless have erected similar groups of works at decisive points in Southern Moravia to stiffen the
defensive front. The number and grouping of the elements of a group of works depend upon their purpose and upon the lie of the country. The work consists of the fighting blocks a, b, c, d,
the entrance work e, the underground passages and the obstacle. 
The two fighting blocks a and b appear to have been chiefly intended for main command and artillery observation posts. They have several armored turrets of cast steel up to 12 inches (300 mm) thick in which there is room for machine and
anti-tank guns, as well as for observers. Blocks c and d are clearly intended
for artillery purposes. In work c only the concrete outer wall was completed;
it enclosed a circular opening of 25 feet (7.5 m) diameter. From this we may conclude
that it was intended as a protective turret for one or two guns. It is an open
question whether these guns were intended for close-range action, or for
long-range fire and protective work. Work d was clearly intended for
short-range actions, i.e., the sweeping of the neighboring foreground. It is a
casemate battery with three 76 mm guns
. The guns are in echelon. Owing to their location and special form of construction, the
loopholes of these guns can not be hit by grazing fire from the front. The design corresponds to certain forms used in pre-war fortification--known in France as "Casemate de Bourges," and in Austria as "TraditorenBatterie."
The entrance work e is so fitted into a steep wooded slope that it cannot possibly be hit from the front by grazing fire, and only with great difficulty by curved fire. Every shot that goes over drops into the hollow behind the fort, while every shot that falls short is caught in the upper part of the slope. The fort is absolutely proof against tanks. The entrance is protected against attack at close quarters by two armored turrets and several loopholes in the walls. Inside the entrance there are additional defensive arrangements: a grated door, enabling men to fire from the inside, and a solid drop-gate with loopholes. There is a break in the entrance passage, which prevents its being swept by fire. Close to the entrance are mine-galleries, by means of which the tunnel can be blown up. The tunnel connects the entrance with the four fighting works. On either side of the tunnel are ammunition stores, and barracks with kitchens and offices, etc. Nearer the four fighting blocks are the living-rooms. The two artillery blocks are connected with the tunnel by means of lifts and stairs, the other two by stairs only. The tunnel is as deep as 160 feet (50 m) below the crest of the hill.
The whole group of works is surrounded by a barbed-wire entanglement, which can be swept by fire.
There are two kinds of obstacles: those against tanks and those against assault-troops. The Czechs usually combined the two in a single obstacle. This has an advantage over the dual system in requiring only one obstacle to be watched and swept by fire--a simplification--and of needing less material and less ground--a reduction in cost. The disadvantage is that the artillery-man, mine-thrower and engineer can destroy both obstacles simultaneously. The Czechs strengthened the tank obstacle by threading it thickly with barbed wire, and by widening it in front and behind with extra rows of stakes.
The obstacles were built in sections, broken short in front. This arrangement prevents the flanking weapons of neighboring works from firing into each other's loopholes.
As an obstacle against tanks the Czechs employ 4-armed reinforced concrete "hedgehogs" and, more recently, 6-armed iron ones.
Presumably the 6-armed iron "hedgehogs" are more effective, more quickly put up, cheaper, and easier to transport than the cumbersome reinforced concrete ones; the iron ones can be taken to pieces and bolted together at site. The action of the "hedgehogs" is as follows. A tank striking against one causes it to roll along in front of it, but the "hedgehog" slows up its advance and, under heavy anti-tank gunfire, the tank is brought to a standstill. "Hedgehogs" should be chained together, so that an advancing tank will have to push a row of them along in front of it. As a rule; two or three rows of "hedgehogs" are arranged one behind the other.
Another form of obstacle, that has only been introduced in recent years, is a row of reinforced-concrete posts. Each column is made up of out of two upright iron channels standing in a concrete socket. The uprights are welded together and filled with concrete.
In some works there are to be found, in lateral prolongation of each wing wall,
a row of long railroad rails, standing upright, embedded close together in the
ground. These are too weak to hold up a tank, but their object is to compel the
tank that is trying to engage the machine-gun loopholes, to advance so far that
it will come under the fire of an anti-tank gun. It will thus not be possible
for the tank first to engage the machine-gun loophole and then the anti-tank
gun loophole. The high upright rails mask the machine-gun loopholes (the
right-hand loophole in the picture) from view and fire of the approaching tank,
until the latter comes into view and under fire of the anti-tank gun loophole
(on the left in the picture).
Tank ditches with walls have only been erected on the flanks of works, in lengths of 55 to 90 yards (50 to 85 m), apparently because upright obstacles would obstruct the view and fire from flanking blocks.
As a naturally strong obstacle in the front line may be mentioned the Danube, between the mouth of the March at Theben and that of the Gran at Gran. This obstacle was supported by the fortifications round Theben, the Engerau bridge-head south of Pressburg (Bratislava), the old Austrian fortress of Komorn at the mouth of the Waag, recently strengthened, and the Gran fortifications, but its main strength was based on the Danube flotilla. The latter consisted of:
President Masaryk: a gunboat of 230 tons armed with 4x 66 mm guns and capable of carrying 10 mines.
OMd 1, 2: smaller gunboats armed with 3x 47mm guns.
Several dozen patrol boats armed with nothing heavier than machine-guns. A few of these were also capable of laying mines.
(The original information has been replaced by more up-to-date data. JL)
The lower March formed a water obstacle not to be underestimated.
If the Czechs had had enough time for preparation at their disposal they could have fortified the Thaya section between Frain and the mouth of the March. They could thus have made use of the flooded area around Frain.
On the whole, time was the decisive factor in Czechoslovak fortification. The questions, where and how the fortifications were to be built, had been clearly laid down. The problem of cost was of comparatively minor importance, since the Allies provided the necessary credit in cash and goods. The main basis of all fortification work, the time for construction, is what sealed the fate of Czechoslovak land fortification.
As long as Germany's power lay in the shackles of the Versailles Treaty, there was no incentive for the Czechs to think of strong land fortifications. It was more to the point to have a powerful, well-equipped army, capable of advancing from Egerland to the west, to join the French, who would have crossed the Rhine and invaded southern Germany. From there they could have marched shoulder to shoulder with their allies in a northerly direction along the valleys, a much simpler method than crossing the rivers from west to east. Small forces would have sufficed to hold up an incursion of the weak German enemy upon the naturally strong boundary of Bohemia or Moravia.
But when the Third Reich came into existence the situation changed. About the beginning of 1933, carefully planned preparations were made for construction; the position of works was laid down, ground reconnaissances were carried out, the network of roads was strengthened and completed, land was acquired, etc. The most important sectors, especially round the Moravian depression and the Glatz basin, were tackled first. The greatest importance appears to have been attached to suitable methods of construction, rather than to speed in execution. But the danger increased when, in 1935, Germany proclaimed its freedom to re-arm. The occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 was a signal for extra speed in construction. The spring of 1938 brought Austria into the Reich. Germany now enclosed bath Bohemia and Moravia, The Czechs continued the work with maximum energy, but their efforts might be compared with an attempt to complete a retaining dam before an oncoming flood. The dreaded flood came all too soon. The dike was still unfinished and could not withstand the rush of water.
A general verdict on the condition of the Czechoslovak defenses in 1938 would be: "Everything still incomplete." There was no such thing as a continuous defensive front. Only a few sectors had, approximately, their full fighting value. A break-through in a few weak spots must have brought about a collapse of the whole defensive system. The Czech soldiers were standing in a position already lost. There is little doubt that the spring, and certainly the autumn of 1939, would have shown a very different picture of the defenses. With the concentration of all the available labor of the country on the building of fortifications, about 75 per cent of its fighting power would have been attained in the spring, and l00 per cent in the autumn. It is certain that in that case the Czech soldiers would never have abandoned their line of fortifications without fighting. They would have defended it, even if their allies had not at once come to their assistance. They would thus have gained time, with the hope that the political and military situation might take a turn in their favor. It was not their fault that they abandoned the ramparts, but the fault of the politicians, who had set the soldiers the enormously hard task of arming and fighting against an immeasurably superior enemy, who hemmed them in from every side, without giving them time fully to prepare for such a struggle.
This article has been lightly edited to remove some extraneous material, correct some information, and to update the style and spelling.
A summary of Jonathan Zorach's conclusions about the true value of Czechoslovakia's Fortifications is recommended reading. More detailed photos of some smaller Czech works.
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