Strategic Air Attack on the German Chemical Industry

Prewar Status of the German Chemical Industry

Germany's ability to wage war rested, in large part, an her famous chemical industries. Except for a brief period after World War I, Germany has been in the foreground of the world's chemistry, scientifically, and industrially, for nearly a century. Before World War I, she controlled 88 percent of the world's dye trade, and before World War II, she handled about 25 percent of all the world's chemical business. Chemical products made up 20 percent of her exports. The industry employed 515,000 workers, 44 per of them in plants of over 1,000 employees, and in 1938 its products were valued at about 5,000,000,000 Reichsmarks.

Landmarks in Germany's chemical progress were Haber and Bosch's discovery (1912) of the commercial synthesis of ammonia by fixation of stmospheric nitrogen, which made Germany independent of Chilean nitrate, and Bergius' discovery (1920) that coal could be liquefied with the use of high-pressure hydrogen to yield gasoline, which pointed the way to self-sufficiency in oil.

Research results multiplied research. The German chemical combines employed great numbers chemists to search for new processes and products. By 1937, 12,000 qualified chemists were on the industry's payroll, and the government had set up the Reich Research Council to supervise research, avoid duplication, and push priority projects.

By the outbreak of World War II, the control of the German chemical industry was remarkably concentrated. The I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. known as the "German Dye Trust" (created in 1925), controlled 85 percent of the whole German chemical industry, including nearly all production of explosives. This made possible the pooling of resources and research, allocation of markets, fixing of prices, and planning of production. After the war began, I.G. Farben headed the government agencies charged with the control of chemical and explosives production.

Germany was well supplied with chemical raw materials - coal and limestone. She also had substantial potassium salt supplies, which yielded by-product magnesium salts for the manufacture of light metals used in aircraftconstruction. Her principal raw material difficulties were in certain metals, particularly those required for alloy steels, in sulfur, and in phosphorus, which she lacked entirely.

Geographic Distribution of the Chemical Industry

Coal and water power sources largely dictated the geography of the German chemical industry. Before the war its plants were concentrated in the Rhine Valley, the Ruhr, and the Leipzig area. When it was realized that bombing could not be prevented German industry could not be attempts were made to establish new centers in central Germany and Upper Silesia.

War Planning

German documents list the following as the most important war chemicals:

Nitrogen, methanol, and ethylene for explosives, calcium carbide for synthetic rubber and other organic chemicals; sodium cyanide for aircraft Plexiglas, case hardening, etc.; tetraethyl lead for aviation gasoline; sulfuric acid, caustic soda, chlorine, and sodium carbonate for hundreds of necessary industrial uses.

To become self-sufficient in these chemicals, the Nazi government created a huge complex set of agencies charged with expanding production capacity and allocating materials and products. This bureaucracy grew progressively more involved as the war developed. Figure 46 shows the complexity of the controls at the end of the war and indicates the responsibilities of the various offices and their relations to industry. Probably because the chemical industry had developed considerable spare productive capacity before the war, the Germans made no serious attempt to build up stock piles of important chemicals - until the development of the global war showed them, too late, that they had underestimated their needs. Nevertheless, the Goering four-year plan, started in 1936, did allow for an increase in production in preparation for war. Figures 47 and 48 show the production of chemicals covered by the four-year plan.

Later plans for new capacity involved expansion of existing plants (Ludwigshafen, Schkopau, and Leverkusen), and the creation of the following entirely new centers:

(a) In the Hartz Mountains and central Germany (emergency plants)

(b) In Upper Silesia (Heydebreck, Blechhammer, and Auschwitz)

(c) On the Upper Danube (Moosbierbaum and Linz)

In addition, under a government-owned corporation, known as the Economic Research Association (WIFO), secret plans were made and carried out for the construction of plants at Doeberitz, Piesteritz, Embsen, Wolfen, Linz, Sondershausen, and Koenigsh. Projects were started also at Holten and Heydebreck, but not completed. Plants for sulfuric acid, chlorine, caustic soda, sodium carbonate, sodium cyanide and ethylene, financed partly by private industries and partly with government funds, were erected at Niedersachswerfen in the Hartz and Schoppernitz in Upper Silesia. Units for the manufacture of heavy chemicals were added in several government-owned plants for explosives and poison gas.

War Production

Even before intensive bombing, began, the chemical industry was not meeting its quotas partly because of the competition of other industries for power and building materials such as steel, and partly because of transportation strain, labor shortages, the cutting off key materials by the Allied blockade, etc. Table 16 indicates the extent to which production in 1940 failed to meet the plan.

As the war progressed, even more difficulties were encountered in the construction of new plants. Not only were labor and structural materials short, but air attacks on factories making chemical equipment - Wilke at Brunswick, where fractionation columns were made, and Krupp at Essen, producing stainless steel - hampered deliveries. Transportation difficulties, accentuated by bombing, caused serious delays, particularly in Silesia and other eastern regions remote from the Ruhr equipment factories. These difficulties delayed or prevented the completion of important plants. Despite great pressure and high priority, such projects as Auschwitz II (nitrogen, methanol, and ethylene derivatives), Fuerstenberg-Degussa (carbide) Heydebreck II (nitrogen and ethyllene derivatives), Koenigshuette II (nitrogen), Knurow (ethylene derivatives), and Moosbierbaum (ethylene derivatives) were never completed. As a result, production fell further. plans, even though the schedules were revised downward. Table 17 compares planned and actual 1943 production rates of 10 important German chemicals.

It will be seen that (a) production rose suprisingly little above the prewar level, and (b) actual production fell well below the plan for 1943, although the plan had been revised downward in 1942. By early 1944, just before the oil offensive began, chemical production had fallen below the mid-1943 level. Table 18 shows production of the important German war chemicals in the first four months of 1944.

These figures indicate the actual production realized by German industries before the heavy bombing of oil-chemical plants started in May, 1944. More nitrogen could have been produced at the expense of synthetic oil, and more methanol could have been produced at the expense of both oil and nitrogen.

Bombing Attacks on Chemical Plants

By far the greater part of the loss of German chemical production from bombing came as an unexpected bonus from the bombing of synthetic oil plants. Many of Germany's chemicals, particularly synthetic nitrogen and methanol, were made in plants which also produced synthetic oil (see Table 19). Ludwigshafen-Oppau, one of Germany's largest chemical plants with minor production, was bombed, apparently with the sole intent of destroying oil production. Considerable damage also resulted from area bombing not directed at specific targets.

From 1 May 1944 to the end of the war a total of 57,519 tons of bombs were aimed at German plants producing chemicals. Of this total, 52,806 tons were aimed at plants also producing synthetic oil or benzol. Thus 92 percent of the attacks on the vital German chemical industry were purely incidental to the attacks on oil production. But 75 percent of Germany's nitrogen industry was located in synthetic oil plants, and two of these (Leuna and Oppau) produced over 50 percent of the synthetic nitrogen. Similarly, 89 percent of Germany's methanol production occurred in plants attacked as part of the oil offensive. Every attack that hit nitrogen or methanol production was aimed at oil.

Other plants producing important chemicals (largely calcium carbide and heavy chemicals) did not contain oil plants. As a result, most of the plants producing these other chemicals were scarcely bombed at all. As shown in Table 26, non-oil-producing chemical plants with a capacity of 554,000 tons per month were attacked with only 4,700 tons of bombs during the entire offensive.

Because of the industry's integration, it is difficult to compute losses in the production of a single chemical as a result of bombing. The best basis seems to be a comparison of the total loss of production of a particular chemical with the total bombing effort against the plants producing that chemical. Table 20 has been prepared on this basis.

Effects of Bombing the Chemical Industry

The bombing offensive against oil targets caused a steady -drop in chemical production, starting in June, 1944. The loss of production of nitrogen and methanol was precipitous and contributed directly to Germany's ultimate defeat. Although serious, the drop in production of other chemicals was less abrupt. Figure 49 shows the monthly production of the more important chemicals and a monthly index of their total.

Nitrogen

Nitrogen production dropped from an average of 75,000 tons per month in the first four months of 1944 to only 20,000 tons in December, despite desperate efforts to maintain the output by giving nitrogen priority even above synthetic oil. From August, 1944, on, all synthetic nitrogen was allocated to munitions. Frantic attempts were made also to convert ammonium sulfate stocks to anhydrous ammonia for production of concentrated nitric acid for explosives, but so little equipment was available that less than 2,000 tons of this nitrogen were produced from September to the end of the war. Two Ruhr plants were converted to enable them to recover 2,000 tons of ammonia per month as ammonia water for subsequent oxidation to nitric acid. These combined efforts were sufficient to maintain the production of nitric acid for munitions at a somewhat higher level than was possible from synthetic nitrogen alone. By January, 1945, however, even nitrogen allocations to munitions had dropped to 20 percent of the production available early in 1944. Ample capacity existed for oxidizing ammonia to nitric acid, for the nitration of various chemicals to make explosives, and for the filling of munitions. Without question, it was the destruction of the ammonia plants through the oil offensive that knocked out Germany's production of munitions.

Germany's nitrogen production facilities possessed all the attributes of a good strategic bombing target. Nitrogen was essential to Germany's war effort, no substitutes were possible, production was concentrated in a few plants, and the plants were vulnerable to air attack. These factors made the bombing of this industry effective and decisive, even though it was not undertaken deliberately as the result of known facts. It was an unexpected and fortuitous by-product of the oil offensive. Clearly, the large nitrogen plants should have had a priority equal to that of oil.

Methanol

The loss of methanol production dealt a further serious blow to the German war economy, because methanol was needed to produce two of Germany's explosives: pentaerythritol-tetra-nitrate, and hexogen. An increasingly large percentage of her TNT production also depended on methanol. Plans for 1944 called for 42 percent of the methanol production be allocated to these uses, and the remainder went to the manufacture of synthetic rubber and numerous other important products.

Early in the war practically all the methanol production was concentrated in one plant, Leuna. During the war three additional plants were completed in Upper Silesia, but, of the 1944 planned production, 47 percent was still to be at Leuna. Production reached a peak of 25,000 tons in January, 1944; a year later it was 3,600 tons. Leuna, which had produced 13,000 tons in January, 1944, was completely knocked out. The bombing of Auschwitz and Heydebreck, which were thought to be producing synthetic oil, accounted for most of the remaining loss of production. As in the case of nitrogen, the Germans had made the mistake of locating their methanol manufacturing facilities largely in oil plants.

There is evidence that the Germans did not need methanol as badly as they needed nitrogen or synthetic oil; hence the plants making it alone did not rate a high bombing priority. The large complex plants where it was manufactured, together with other products, should, however, have had the highest priority.

Other Chemicals

Tetraethyl lead plants in Germany were never specifically attacked or damaged by bombing although this product was an absolutely essential component of German aviation gasoline and its production was concentrated in two plants. Furthermore, there was very little spare capacity. The equipment was also very vulnerable and difficult to replace. For these reasons specific attacks on tetraethyl lead plants been disastrous to the Germans, and should have had a top priority in bombing.

The other principal chemicals tacked as specific targets, although some of the plants were hit. The declines in their production, as indicated in Figure 49, were much less than the production of synthetic oil, nitrogen, or methanol, and were the result mainly of the deterioration of German industry. Although these chemicals were basically important, production losses would not have been felt as quickly or keenly as losses of oil or nitrogen. Therefore, plants making only these products would not warrant a high bombing priority.

DispersaI Plans and Underground Chemical Plants

No serious consideration was given to underground locations or dispersal of chemical plants, until the third quarter of 1944. It was then too late carry out the small program planned. Serious differences of opinion always existed among German agencies and industrialists on this subject. According to the predominant opinion, large-scale underground construction of heavy chemcial plants was impractical because of the size of the equipment involved. As a compromise measure, plans were proposed to disperse plants to hillside slopes where certain units would be sunk into the ground, leaving the contour of the landscape unchanged. Late in 1944, when the severity of air attacks had convinced the Germans that complete protection could be gained only through underground construction, plans for the so-called "Orion" project were drawn up. This provided for a single underground plant which could produce 4,000 tons of nitrogen per month, or, if necessary, could be converted to produce 5,000 tons of methanol. The plant was to start operation on 1 July 1945. Nine other small nitrogen fixation plants with a total capacity of about 15,000 tons of nitrogen were also planned, but this program was impeded by the general shortage of materials and labor, and none of the plants was completed. Four methanol projects, also uncompleted, would have provided small surface units of about 2,000 tons per month capacity.

Plans were drafted in September, 1944, for a tetraethyl lead plant with a capacity of 200 tons per month to be installed in five months in a natural cave in Brixlegg, Austrian Tyrol. This project was given high priority and equipment had not been started when the area was occupied by the Allied forces.

Some dispersal of other chemical manufacturing was planned, but this either had not materialized or was incomplete at the end of the war. These projects included the transfer of an acetone producing plant from Knapsack to Fuerstenberg-on-Oder, the erection of plants at Falkenau near Eger to make cyanide, and the reconstruction of the Frankfurt cyanide plant.

Six lignol plants, with a proposed monthly production of 100 tons of Furfural, 60 tons of chlorine, and 60 tons of caustic soda, were also planned and a project was proposed for the erection of an acrylonitrile plant at Dyhrenfurth with a productive capacity of 100 tons per month, construction to start on 1 January 1945. No part of this program was completed.

Even had these various plans been completed so that the proposed plants had been could have started operation by the end of 1944, attacks on transportation had by then reached such intensity that the plants could neither have received raw material nor shipped products.

Berlin, 30 August 1944

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