Strategic Air Attack on the German Rubber Industry

In World War I, Germany learned thoroughly the necessity of having enough rubber to wage war successfully. She understood clearly the importance of rubber for airplanes, tanks, and motorized transport. Yet she entered World War II on a shoestring, as far as rubber stocks were concerned.

Before the war German was the third largest consumer of the world's rubber supplies, ranking after the United States and the United Kingdom. Per capita, Germany used roughly a fourth as much natural rubber as the United States, compared to one fifteenth of United States consumption of oil. Germany's prewar imports and consumption of natural rubber are shown in Table 21.²

In comparison, the United States rubber industry in 1939 consumed about 600,000 tons of natural rubber.

Development of Synthetic Processes

To make up her deficiency in rubber in World War I, Germany developed Methyl rubber, a substitute so soft that cars with tires made of it had to be jacked up at night. After that war, the I.G. searched for a better substitute. First they developed a fair synthetic based on butadiene alone; by 1930 they had developed Buna S, a satisfactory tire rubber, and an oil-resistant rubber for special uses.

The basic raw material for all these rubber substitutes was coal, which assured Germany of self-sufficiency in case war cut her off from sea-borne supplies. The main raw materials used in the synthesis of Buna S are butadiene and styrene. Butadiene was made from acetylene derived either from calcium carbide or from the gases from coal hydrogenation, while styrene was derived from coal tar, benzene, and ethylene. Buna S manufacture is also heavily on coal as a source of electric power since it takes 18,000 to 19,000 kwh of power to produce a ton of Buna. The whole synthetic rubber program consumed as much electric power as the great city of Philadelphia. Despite the abundance of coal in Germany, the industry was vulnerable because it was closely integrated and interrelated with the chemical and synthetic oil industries. Between 1936 and 1939, synthetic rubber production increased from 1,100 to 21,256 metric tons per year, and consumption rose from 1,020 to 14,300 tons per year.

Rubber Processing Industry

Before the war the German rubber processing industry consisted of some 278 rubber factories, of which 53 were major producers. (See Figure 50 and also Appendix Tables C 1 and C 2. The most important units were:

(a) 11 tire factories, four producing tires, seven producing both tires and mechanical goods.
(b) 13 mechanical goods factories, in addition to the seven combination factories mentioned.
(c) 29 important producers of sanitary and seamless rubber goods, shoes, heels, rubberized fabrications, thread, adhesive, etc.

In addition to processing 73,000 to 97,000 metric tons of natural rubber a year before the war, Germany also processed between 29,000 and 35,000 tons of reclaimed rubber, mainly for use in mechanical goods.

The German prewar situation on carbon black, which she started to produce domestically in 1933, was quite satisfactory. In other raw materials (mineral oils, diverse chemicals, accelerators, pigments, and textile fibers) Germany was either self-sufficient or had developed suitable substitutes.

War Plans for Rubber

Synthetic Rubber Industry. In anticipation of war, Germany's new synthetic rubber industry was given a substantial tariff protection, culminating with a duty of 30.9 cents per pound imposed on 21 March 1938. This compares with a 1939 New York market price for imported natural rubber of 16 cents per pound. In addition, the I.G.'s Buna development was subsidized directly and, under the 1937 four-year plan, the government authorized the construction of three 25,000-ton synthetic rubber plants, besides the, pilot plant at Leverkusen which was already in operation. The planned capacity of all these plants was slightly less than Germany's prewar needs and was increased before construction was completed on the first two plants, as follows:

(a) Capacity at Schkopau, where operations began in 1938, was increased to 72,000 tons. Schkopau's acetylene came from calcium carbide made on the site, and the plant's annual Buna production rate stood at 25,000 tons by September, 1939.

(b) By the time construction began at Huels in 1938, its design rating was 48,000 tons. The acetylene for Huels was produced by the electric arc process from gases which came mainly from the near-by Scholven and Gelsenberg hydrogenation plants.

Late in 1939 the third plant, at Rattwitz near Breslau, was approved, but it was never completed because after the easy victory in France the High Command and the German Ministry for Economic Affairs decided to rely upon cheap natural rubber from the Japanese. By September, 1940, the government had changed its mind and pressed for a new plant at Ludwigshafen. This plant, designed to produce 30,000 tons of rubber annually from a new butadiene synthesis based on the reaction of acetylene and formaldehyde, tied Buna production to methanol (via formaldehyde) and further inter-related the Ludwigshafen-Oppau production complex. This plant was not in full operation until September, 1943.

The last step in the Buna plan involved the erection of a 36,000-ton plant (together with chemical and oil plants) at Auschwitz, Poland, believed to be safe from air attack. Only a few parts of this plant operated before its capture. Including the 6,000-ton pilot plant at Leverkusen, the ultimate planned capacity of the synthetic rubber plants was 192,000 metric tons a year, about twice Germany's prewar consumption of natural rubber. The geographic location of these plants is shown in Figure 51.

The Italians operated one small plant at Ferrara and planned but never completed a larger one at Terni. A plant was projected for France at Anglofort.

Rubber Processing Industry. In terms of total rubber consumption, including reclaim, the pre-war capacity of the rubber processing industry was about 15,000 metric tons a month. Of this capacity 57 percent was devoted to mechanical and technical goods, 33 percent to tires (including solids), 7 percent to bogie wheels, tank treads, and blocks, and 3 percent to camelback and repair materials.

No new rubber manufacturing plants were built after war broke out, but capacity of existing machinery was increased by some 20 percent - part for new war products, part to offset production difficulties incident to conversion to synthetic rubber. In general, after allowing for the greater difficulty of handling synthetics, Germany's war potential in was no greater than her prewar capacity.

Government Controls. Dr. Krauch, Commissioner General for Problems of the Chemical Industry, was co-ordinator of controls over synthetic rubber as well as those over synthetic oil, chemicals, and explosives. The Government Board for Rubber administered processing-industry policies laid down by ministry offices, while the Industry Group-Rubber (Fachgruppe Kautschuk) handled technical problems such as standardization and costs (see Figure 11).

Stock Position. Dr. Otto Friedrich, Deputy Director of the Government Board for Rubber, reports that a frantic search of all Europe in August, 1939, netted only 7,000 tons of natural rubber from Holland. At the end of that month, Germany's stocks amounted to only 2.4 months' prewar consumption (19,383 tons, 76 percent natural rubber, 24 percent Buna). Moreover, the stock of reclaim was 4,969 tons, equivalent to only two months' supply.

Because the synthetic rubber industry was in its infancy and the rubber processing industry had not yet converted to synthetics, the Germans gambled even more on rubber stocks than on oil stocks. And the same gamble was taken finished rubber products: on 31 August the finished tire stocks of 500,000 represented only 1.2 months of peacetime consumption.

Loss of Production and Air Attacks - Synthetic Rubber Industry

Priority Considerations. The German synthetic industry formed a highly vulnerable target system concentrated throughout the war in large plants. Yet, although certain of the plants were attacked sporadically as priority objectives, the industry was not subjected to prolonged or concentrated attack.

Until March, 1943, when the Ludwigshafen plant came into partial operation, there were two large rubber plants (Schkopau and Huels) and one small plant (Leverkusen). Thereafter, since Auschwitz was captured by the Russians before getting into full production, there were only four plants. But synthetic rubber plants were not placed in the first bombing priority category until 10 November 1943, and then they were given fourth place in the category. They came off the priority list entirely in May, 1944, when oil was given top priority. Huels was attacked once and Leverkusen once as number 1 priority targets of the Eighth Air Force. Ludwigshafen was repeatedly attacked by the RAF and the Eighth, but apparently the rubber plants were never the primary aiming point. The Auschwitz plant was a number 1 priority target for the Fifteenth Air Force three times.

Attack Data. Table 22 shows the distribution of the 19,458 tons of bombs dropped at synthetic rubber plants.

Over 75 percent of this tonnage was dropped at Ludwigshafen, where it was aimed primarily at oil installations, though synthetic rubber production was also jeopardized. Of the total bombs dropped at both the rubber and oil industries, rubber took only one tenth as much as oil. The effects of direct and indirect bombing on synthetic rubber are shown in Figure 52. Details on German synthetic rubber and rubber raw material production are presented in Appendix Tables C 3, C 4, C 5, and C 6.

Production Loss Before Oil Offensive. As Table 22 indicates, this period divides into three phases:

(a) Up to 10 June 1943, no priority was assigned to synthetic rubber, but the 72 tons of bombs dropped by the RAF (particularly in the Huels attack of 28/29 December 1941) caused a noticeable break in the upward production trend.

(b) Between 10 June and 10 November 1943, synthetic rubber targets had a number 3 priority. At the start of this period Schkopau and Huels were nearly up to rated capacity (5,800 and 3,800 tons a month, respectively) and Ludwigshafen had come into partial production. Stocks of natural and synthetic rubber were to down to one month's supply (9,000 tons). When the Eighth Air Force attacked Huels on 22 June 1943, they shut down the plant entirely for one month causing a loss of 12,000 tons of production. The end result of this attack was to send rubber stocks, excluding reclaim, to a low of 6,500 tons by September (see Figure 53), forcing the government planners to reduce the stock of finished tires to 1 1/2 months' supply, and holding production of tires and other rubber articles at levels 10 to 15 percent below schedule for the last six months of 1943.

(c) By 10 November 1943, when rubber went into the first priority category, the industry had recovered so that stocks were slightly higher the September low and production was back to 11,000 tons a month. From then until 12 May 1944, most of the raids concentrated on Ludwigshafen but that plant nonetheless worked up to 85 percent of rated capacity, and the entire industry reached an all-time peak of 12,787 tons in March before a decline set in.

Loss of Production during the Oil Offensive.

After the start of the oil bombing offensive, the decline in synthetic rubber production (see Figure 52) was not unlike that in aviation gasoline, as Table 23 shows. Thus, though only 15,736 tons of bombs wee dropped at its plants, the synthetic rubber industry, because of its integration with oil and chemicals, suffered a crushing blow. This is what happened:

(a) Schkopau production was lost because the Leuna hydrogen producing facilities were knocked out. The meager 2.6 percent Of Leuna's hydrogen earmarked for Schkopau was its sole supply and stood at the head of Leuna's priority list. Despite all Leuna could do, Schkopau lost 43,600 tons of rubber production (compared, to its January-April average) during the oil offensive.

(b) Huels lost production because of its dependence on gas from the bombed synthetic oil plants at Scholven and Gelsenberg. This was partially offset by bringing in natural gas from Bentheim and acetaldehyde from Bavaria.

(c) Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen rubber production dropped because of the bombing of oil plants at the former and chemical plants at the latter.

From the start of the oil offensive to the end of the war, the over-all loss of Buna production compared to the first four months of 1944 amounted to 75,000 tons.

Total Loss of Production. It is difficult to evaluate satisfactorily the total loss of synthetic rubber production because, while the industry was subject to some attack from 1941 on, it was continually being expanded. However, the estimated losses of 12,000 tons from the 22 June 1943 attack on Huels, plus a 4,000-ton loss from previous Huels attacks, plus the estimated 75,000-ton loss during the oil offensive, adds up to 91,000 tons of lost production.

This figure is conservative when actual versus planned production is taken into account. The plan put forward in early 1941 contemplated an ultimate annual production of 200,000 tons by the last quarter of 1944. Figure 52 shows this plan and how production lagged behind it. On this basis, the total production loss was 183,000 tons. Even if the actual loss was only the 91,000 tons already mentioned, each of the 10,458 tons of bombs expended on synthetic rubber resulted in production loss of 4.7 metric tons.

Loss of Production and Air Attacks - Rubber Fabricating Industry

Summary. Throughout the war, the German rubber fabricating industry operated on a hand-to-mouth basis. Because stocks were always relatively tight, the slightest loss in rubber production made itself felt immediately in finished product output. Thus the June, 1943, Huels attack reduced tire and rubber boot production at Phoenix by about 50 percent within a month, while compound consumption at the huge Continental plant dropped more than 40 percent in production was rapid in both cases. Appendix Table C 7 outlines the drastic reduction, about 25 percent, that had to be made in allocations of finished products as a result of this raid on Huels.

The fabricating industry, particularly tires (which enjoyed a number 3 Eighth Air Force bombing priority between 10 June and 10 November 1943), was also subjected to direct attack, as shown in Table 24.

Though only 443 tons of bombs were aimed at tire plants per se, according to available information, many tire plants also underwent area attacks because they were located in cities. The effects of attacks on production of pneumatic tires of various types are shown in Figures 54 and 55. Production schedules for individual plants and total actual consumption of rubber for pneumatic tires are given in Appendix Table C 8. Before the bombing of Huels in the middle of 1943, normal consumption of rubber for pneumatic tires was 3,300 to 3,400 tons a month. These charts show that, in spite of some attacks and the hand-to-mouth stock situation, the drop in rubber consumption for tires did not start until September, but that from then on serious and rapid drops occurred in the production of heavy-duty truck, airplane, and passenger car tires.

Physical Effects of Bombing. The ph ysical effects of strategic bombing on the German rubber fabricating industry are covered below. Detailed comments on the results of air attack on principal German rubber fabricating plants from the end of May, 1943, to November, 1944 can be found in Appendix Table C 9.

A Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee estimate of the residual producing capacity of the nine largest fabricating plants (Appendix Table C 10) indicates that, after bombing, these plants had only 45 percent of 1943 capacity.

Effects of Bombing on Production. Although there is substantial disagreement among sources on finished product production, particularly as to the latter months of the war, following are the estimated results of the air attacks on the industry:

(a) The pneumatic tire fabricating plants during the period from 1 January 1944 to 1 March 1945 were able to convert only 38,117 tons of rubber into tires, and the Oil Division estimates that the total was probably no more than 40,000 tons at the war's end. This amounts to a loss, over the 16-month period, of about 14,000 tons, or four-months' normal consumption (as compared with a normal of 3,400 tons per month).

(b) The loss in actual tires produced for the 12 months of 1944 (see Appendix Table C 11 is summarized in Table 25.

(c) The loss in mechanical goods cannot be precisely calculated, but it is reflected in the over-all consumption of rubber. See Figure 56 and Appendix Tables C 12 and C 13 on shipments of mechanical goods.

(d) The total consumption of natural, synthetic, and reclaim rubber from the start of the war until 1 January 1945 compares as follows with (1) the industry's capacity in its best month (March, 1943) projected over 64 months and (2) a monthly capacity for all types of rubber of 15,000 tons (according to Dr. Friedrich):

The estimated loss of 283,418 tons in rated capacity is equivalent to 15,000,000³ heavy-duty tires. Main items contributing to the loss are (a) destruction of rubber fabricating plants, (b) lack of Buna rubber resulting from bomb damage to synthetic rubber plants, (c) interferences with transportation of raw material, (d) withdrawal of trained personnel from the rubber fabricating industry, (e) lack of power at fabricating plants of air attacks, etc. Several examples of difficulties in transporting raw materials from the synthetic rubber plants to the fabricating plants were observed. At Schkopau, in the middle of 1944, 1,500 tons of Buna could not be moved because of lack of transportation. At Continental, the lack of raw material deliveries caused the available supplies to fall from an equivalent of six weeks' production in January to two days in December, 1944.

Ebb and Flow of Germany's Rubber Position, Consumption, and Stock Level

Consumption-Production Balance: Raw Rubber. Table 26 gives an over-all consumption-producing balance for the German natural and synthetic rubber industry from the start of the war to 1 January 1945. It is based on German statistics up to the end of October, 1944, and Oil Division estimates for the rest of 1944. Thereafter conditions in German industry were too chaotic for further estimates.

A breakdown of rubber consumption by principal classes of products for the period 1939 through 1943 is given in Appendix Table C 14. Information on Buna exports from September, 1942, through August, 1943, is given in Appendix Tables C 15 and C 16.

Total consumption exceeded supply by only 6,616 tons, or about 1 percent. Although 82.8 percent of Germany's needs came from synthetic rubber, the contribution of natural rubber was of especial strategic importance, since it was necessary for certain critical tire parts. Though the stock withdrawal seems small, it is significant in view of the very low stocks at the start of the war. At the end of 1944, the estimated stock pile of natural and synthetic rubber was only 7,270 tons (5,200 tons Buna), or less than one month's supply for the industry before bombing. Reclaim consumption from September, 1939, to January, 1945, amounted to 238,841 tons, and was apparently about equal to production, since stocks stayed at about the same level.

Substantial quantities of rubber were lost at Ludwigshafen (784 tons) and Huels (500 tons) in fires that raged for days. Equally serious losses occurred at Continental, until the plant resorted to storing raw stocks underground. Loss of stocks of finished rubber goods during the reptreat on the Russian front was reported to be enormous.

Distribution and Stocks of Fabricated Rubber. According to The Government Board for Rubber, fabricated rubber articles were distributed to the army and the civilian economy as outlined in Table 27. This table shows that the proportion of all fabricated articles, going to the armed forces was increasing steadily throughout the war.

In the tire category, however, the armed forces received 75 percent of the production until the latter part of the war when the army's share had risen to 85 percent. (See Appendix Table C 17.) For details of the stock situation, planned and actual production of tires, and the increased military drain on production, see Appendix Table C 11. Briefly, between January and December, 1944, total stocks of passenger tires decreased from 27,720 to 18,306, while truck and bus tire stocks dropped frorn 59,429 to 19,201, despite the fact that tire production increased until August of that year. The stock of these materials at the end of the year represented only a few days' requirements based on prebombing conditions. Thus, as Appendix Table C 13 shows in more detail, the army consumed increasing quantities of replacement tires to make up for destruction and wear as the Allies pushed their land offensives.

Priority and Allocation Trends. Priorities for fabricated rubber goods were set up in the following order:

(a) Tires. Airplane tires had the absolute priority, followed by truck and tire repair materials and passenger and bicycle tires. The production program was stipulated each month and it was elastically adapted to the army's requirements.

(b) Mechanical goods. Tank and airplane needs came first, followed by gas protection equipment, and army and navy accessories. Production programs were set every three months at the most and were geared to the airplane, motor car, and tank programs.

(c) Civilian goods. Conveyor belts, hose and railway production came first. Production was adjusted as well as possible to essential needs, with unlimited production authorized when and if a decisive shortage turned up (for example, because of leather shortage, rubber sole and heel production was to increased from 100 tons to 700 tons a month). Production of all dispensable consumer goods (raincoats, mats, etc.) was prohibited from the outset of the war.

After the outbreak of war, production planning was not altered frequently. However as a result of the combined bomber offensive, the following changes were made after mid-1943:

(a) The entire production program was increased, and absolute priority was given to airplane tires until the autumn of 1944.

(b) Special government support was given to production of fires for 3- and 4 1/2-ton trucks, even at the expense of other sizes of tires. Tank track production was increased and given the same priority as truck tires.

(c) Submarine accessories (especially batteries) and airplane parts (especially fuel cells) were given the highest priority in in rubber goods.

(d) There were sharp reductions in rubber products for less essential industries, civilians, and the export market.

In general, actual production lagged planned production. The allocation of finished products was strictly regimented. Representatives of the armed forces and the established quotas for the army consumption. Actual distribution to forces was handled by offices set up by the army, navy, and air forces. Distribution for civilian consumption was handled by regional government offices.

Rubber Quality. During the early part of the sufficient natural rubber was available so that the Germans were not forced to make an all-synthetic rubber tire. In 1943, according to Dr. Weber of Continental Rubber Company, they attempted the manufacture of 100 percent Buna S tires, but considerable difficulty resulted. There is some conflict in information obtained from the Germans as to subsequent developments, particularly those occurring near the end of the war. Some improvement in fabrication is reported to have been obtained in 1944 by the use of Buna S 3, a more adhesive and more workable type of Buna. In general, it appears that the fabricators had the alternative for tire manufacture of either (1) using 14 percent natural rubber and 86 percent synthetic if natural rubber were available or (2) employing 100 percent synthetic with Koresin, a potent tackifier discovered by the Germans. Koresin was always in short supply, however, because of the bombing of the only producing unit at Ludwigshafen. Dr. Weber reports that tubes made of 100 percent synthetic rubber were tried, but performance was so poor that after the middle of 1944 it was decided to use 25 percent natural rubber.

Carbon Black Production and Consumption

According to the Germans, carbon black supplies were adequate for all rubber requirements during the war. The industry had a capacity rating of about 79,000 tons per annum before bombing.

Production, which exceeded consumption by a small margin over the years 1942-44 ran from 50,000 to 58,000 tons per year. Appendix Table C 18 presents a detailed balance for the year 1944 prepared by the Degussa Company, large manufacturers of carbon black. Although some of the carbon black plants were out of action during the war as the result of bombing (see Appendix Table C 19), the decrease in requirements as the result of bombing of the fabricating plants prevented a shortage. Undoubtedly black would have limited rubber consumption otherwise. Stocks of black at the end of the war in the territory occupied by the American, British, and French forces amounted to only 3,000 tons, less than one month's normal requirement.

Attempt to Protect the Rubber Industry from Bombing

Although the decision to disperse and go underground in the oil industry had been taken in June, 1944, it was not until the beginning of 1945 that an underground Buna plant project was undertaken. A number of locations were selected but were rejected in favor of a large concrete vault at Muehldorf. The synthetic rubber plant was to have a capacity of 1,000 tons per month with the possibility of later expansion to 2,000 tons. It was to operate on acetaldehyde and ethyl benzene brought in from near-by plants. A tire factory to handle the rubber was also, planned in this same vault. Construction was undertaken in March, 1945, but excavation was not complete and no equipment had been installed when the vault was captured by the American Army.

Underground tire fabrication was attempted at Tharandt near Dresden. Several of the bombed rubber fabricating plants had dismantled equipment but had been unable to move it from plants to the underground location because of transportation tie-ups. No information is available on the planned capacity of this plant.

Accuracy of Intelligence Estimates

The location of all the German synthetic rubber plants was known to the Allied intelligence agencies. The estimates of capacity varied considerably, with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare underestimating and the United States Informal Rubber Committee overestimating the plant capacity, as Table 28 indicates.

As regards actual production, the Ministry of Economic Warfare estimated that in May,1944, the Germans were producing at the. rate of 104,000 tons per year of synthetic rubber, which is in good agreement with the actual rate of 108,000. The ministry estimated that natural rubber was coming in through blockade at the. rate of 5,000 tons per year. Actually, shipments of natural rubber had ceased by that time, although 1943 imports were about 6,000 tons.

The intelligence on the fabricating plants and their location was satisfactory, but the Ministry of Economy Warfare underestimated tire production, placing the production of truck, motor, and airplane tires at 169,000 per month. Actual May production was 233,000. Stocks of natural rubber were overestimated by the British agency at 10,000 tons in 1944, whereas actual stocks were about 4,500 tons at the end of 1943 and sank steadily from that period to 2,470 tons in October, 1944. However, the Ministry of Economic Warfare did predict that natural rubber stocks would be critical by the summer of 1944. Underlying the lack of interest in the synthetic rubber industry as a target was the belief that Germany had a sufficient cushion of raw materials and finished products to absorb the shock of an attack on the industry.

Conclusions

When war ended in Europe, damage to the German rubber industry was insufficient to constitute a major factor in the Wehrmacht's defeat. The important damage that had been done was in large part an accidental dividend derived from the all-out oil offensive that began in May, 1944. While it is true that lack of gasoline alone stalled the German war machine, so that attacks on rubber plants appeared to be unnecessary, there is considerable evidence that, had synthetic oil, rubber, and chemicals been considered as a single target group, the same results could have been achieved more expeditiously. This evidence includes:

(1) Interviews with German government officials which revealed that they were in constant dread of an all-out attack on synthetic rubber particularly after the successful bombing of Huels. Knowledge of the vulnerability of these plants caused drastic conservation measures, culminating in an order limiting all traffic behind the front (military and civilian) to a maximum speed of 17 miles per hour.

(2) The highly successful results of the one attack on Huels in June, 1943, which caused a loss of 12,000 tons of Buna production and reduced stocks of both raw rubber and finished tires to 1 and 1.5 months' normal consumption, respectively. Nazi experts were amazed that such an attack was not repeated. They testified that similar attacks on Schkopau, Ludwigshafen, and Leverkusen could have paralyzed the rubber industry and left Germany rubberless in four months.

The 5 August 1944 report of the German Air Force Staff, Plans Division, states, "The destruction of Schkopau, together with one of the other three plants (Huels, Ludwigshafen, Auschwitz) will cripple more than than two thirds, total Buna production and have a catastrophic effect on the rubber supply, vital to the armament industry."

(3) The fact that the attacks on synthetic oil plants, roundabout as they were in terms of direct planning against synthetic rubber, reduced Buna production from an average of 11,800 tons per month in the first four months of 1944 to 1,800 tons in December. Buna stocks dropped from 13,000 tons in January, 1944, to 5,000 tons at the beginning of 1945, and the government belatedly decided to put a rubber plant underground.

The drop in Buna production had an almost immediate effect on fabrication and fabricated stocks. Tire rubber consumption dropped from a normal level of 3,400 metric tons a month to 943 tons in February, 1945. During 1944, stocks of heavy-duty tires dropped from 59,400 in January to 19,200 in December and production of airplane tires declined from 40,000 a month to 19,000.

That this much damage was done almost inadvertently (except for the one Huels attack) - or at least with very sporadic bombing priorities directed against rubber production - indicates how much more could have been accomplished by a consciously co-ordinated attack. The fact remains that, at war's end, while the air force had put the rubber industry on the rocks, the German war effort had not been directly affected by a shortage of rubber.

The conclusions suggested are:

(1) Synthetic rubber plants offered an effective target system, easily identified, vulnerable and slow to repair. Moreover, the product of these plants was absolutely essential to modern warfare.

(2) The fabricating plants were not an ideal target system since they were numerous, dispersed, and relatively easy to repair. As such they should have not been included on the target list, at least until after raw material plants had been taken care of.

(3) The air forces' target intelligence, while essentially correct in appraising the German rubber industry, erred in overlooking the inseparability as targets of rubber and other chemical plants, and over estimated the stock cushion.

(4) The best way to insure that Allied air attacks inflicted the greatest harm to the over-all German war effort would have been to consider synthetic oil, chemical, and rubber targets as a group. Had the delicate interrelationship between Buna and the other chemical products been defined and considered in operational plans from the beginning, it is felt that an even larger extra dividend would have resulted from the oil offensive in the form of a more complete stoppage of synthetic rubber production in time to have contributed directly to the collapse of Nazi Germany.

The production of synthetic rubber, one of the most important branches of the chemical industry, is especially vulnerable to air attack. To date, production has been confined to three plants (Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Huels, and Schkopau). A fourth plant, Auschwitz, is expected to begin operations in May. Over one half of the production of Buna to date came from the Schkopau plant, and approximately 30 percent from Huels. The loss of these two plants would have grave effect on German rubber production, despite the fact that when the new plant reaches full capacity, the total production will be back to two thirds of the original output.

From German Air Force Staff, Plans Division Report of 10 December 1944

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